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Introduction  
 
“England is the gaping hole in the devolution settlement” (Hazell 2006, p 38)  
 
This discussion is concerned with sub-national governance in England. It will be suggested that the 
most striking characteristic of English sub-national governance is its fragmentary nature, embracing 
regions (if they can still be said to exist), city-regions (subject to varying definition) and local 
government (sub-divided from place to place into a number of differing structures). This complex 
pattern of sub-national provision has grown ever-more varied, subject to ad hoc initiatives, with no 
overall rationale. It will be argued that - in contrast to other parts of the United Kingdom - there is 
currently no political incentive to address the nature of English sub-national governance. The paper 
examines component elements of English governance before drawing conclusions about prospects 
for change.   
 
 
Governing England  
 
“The House of Commons does not differentiate its mode of operation for English as compared with 
UK-wide matters. It lacks a capacity to focus directly on England just at the point when more of its 
work deals with English matters. In the absence of change in the way the House of Commons works, 
the consequence...may be to impede the voicing of any distinctively English concerns...that exist on 
wholly or mainly English matters.” (McKay Commission 2013, p 13)   
 
Discussing the overall governance of England is problematic in several senses (Fenwick, McMillan 
and Elcock 2009). First, there is no dedicated national assembly exclusively charged with the 
governance of England: this role is subsumed within the constitutional responsibilities of the United 
Kingdom parliament. This did not seem so odd when Scotland and Wales were similarly subject to 
central governance from Westminster (the relationship with Northern Ireland was always different, 
varying from devolved power to direct rule) but devolved governance in Scotland and Wales now 
places the English anomaly in sharp relief. Secondly, there is little mainstream political debate about 
the governance of England. If such debate exists at all, it is a relatively quiet discussion on the 
periphery of polite politics, although there is emergent academic research on the consequences for 
England of ‘asymmetrical’ UK devolution (Copus 2009) and the role of local political institutions in 
addressing Englishness (Cox and Jeffery 2014). Thirdly, the collapse of efforts under New Labour to 
establish an elected tier of English regional governance means that such debates have effectively 
been shelved, as there is no political incentive for English parties to address them. Fourthly, 
successive waves of local government reorganisation in England have continually shifted attention 
toward the local and away from the national (English) picture. Furthermore, discussion of English 
governance continues to have an unresolved relationship with discussions of Britishness, not least 
because of the terminological ease with which the two are substituted, either through ignorance or 
deliberate political obfuscation. This too makes it difficult to address English governance as a 
discrete topic. In this context, Pocock’s masterful analysis (1975) of the meaning of ‘British’ still 
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repays attention, alongside Colley’s more recent exploration of the ambiguities of British identity 
(2014).     
 
Hazell (2006, p 37) memorably noted that the United Kingdom is a union “...that works in practice 
but not in theory”. Although the first part of this assertion has come under serious pressure in recent 
years, the statement remains a succinct way to capture the problem of English governance. In the 
following discussion ‘governance’ will be taken to denote the organisational and institutional 
arrangements in place within England – arrangements for which the narrow term ‘government’ 
would be insufficient.    
 
 
Whatever Happened to the English Regions?  
 
“The emergence of multi-level governance challenges much of our traditional understanding of how 
the state operates, what determines its capacities, what its contingencies are, and ultimately of the 
organisation of democratic and accountable government” (Peters and Pierre 2001, p 131).  
 
The Government Offices for English Regions were established in 1994. Under New Labour (1997-
2010) they very much reflected the presence of central Government in the region – rather than a 
regional presence within Government. The Government Offices were abolished by the UK coalition 
government and disappeared in 2011. However there are several strands to disentangle within this 
deceptively simple picture. Under New Labour the pattern of English regional governance was 
complex, reflecting a number of competing political and policy interests (see Pearce and Ayres 
2012). 
 
First, the Government Offices were not the only important element. In the eight Regions outside 
London there were also (non-elected) Regional Assemblies, with members largely appointed by local 
councils. Although these occupied a low public profile and, politically, their disappearance was 
relatively uncontroversial, they formed part of a regional infrastructure that has now been removed, 
being abolished between 2008 and 2010.    
 
Secondly, there was a continuing debate about whether new forms of Regional Assembly based on 
direct election could provide a basis for democratic regional governance. This was not at all a new 
debate. Governmental institutions for separate English regions were mooted before World War One, 
partly linked to possible implications of Irish home rule for the government of England. Subsequent 
enquiries into local government, including the Redcliffe Maud Report (Royal Commission on Local 
Government in England 1969) considered the regional dimension but it never became a political 
priority. Some Labour Members of Parliament had argued the case for English regional devolution 
(eg, Quin 1993). Subsequently, under New Labour, the debate acquired a higher profile but largely 
this was played out within the Labour Party, with the greatest enthusiasm being displayed by John 
Prescott (and party interests associated with him) rather than by Blair himself. When the first and 
only referendum on establishing an elected Regional Assembly was held in North East England in 
2004, and heavily defeated, the debate about establishing structures for democratic regional 
governance effectively disappeared from the political agenda.  
 
Thirdly, and of fundamental relevance to any debate about English governance, the coalition formed 
in 2010 not only abolished Government Offices for the Regions, it also abolished regions themselves 
in any meaningful sense. Although the Office for National Statistics still uses the nine former regions 
as a basis for generating statistical data, they play no part in governance, administration or decision-
making.  
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Fourthly, in addition to the abolition of regional Government Offices, the Regional Development 
Agencies (RDAs) were wound up by the coalition. This placed the responsibility for investment and 
regeneration very much on the shoulders of local councils, with significant implications for English 
regional development. In North East England particularly this raises the question of competitive 
disadvantage in comparison with Scotland’s commitment to, and infrastructure for, attracting 
investment.   
 
Fifthly, the remaining public sector regional associations lack any statutory basis. The Association of 
North-East Councils (ANEC) is a cross-party body and maintains an active presence in articulating the 
regional voice of its 12 local councils, but is the sole public sector grouping of its kind in the region. 
Its members are involved in governance in their local areas but the association is not itself part of 
the governance framework. 
 
Under present conditions, then, the region may not look like a promising basis for rethinking English 
sub-national governance in any intelligible sense. The essential barrier is that all debates around 
English regions are now far removed from the political reality of the three main English parties. 
There is no political incentive to address the vacuum of English regional governance because it offers 
no political premium whatsoever. Yet there is no doubt that factors including poverty and 
productivity vary substantially from one English region to another and have done so for a very long 
time (IPPR/NEFC 2012). It is hard therefore to sustain a position wherein regions ‘don’t matter’ as an 
element of English civil and political society. Clearly they do, but their definition and status remain 
problematic for central government.  
 
There is one exception, of course, and that is London. London-as-region has its own directly-elected 
regional assembly and directly-elected mayor. Its governance structures and powers are clearly 
established in relation to central government and in relation to individual London boroughs (four of 
which also have directly elected mayors). Arguably the pattern of governance in London has 
delivered competitive advantage through streamlined decision-making and highly visible leadership, 
but the important point - frequently overlooked – is that the structures of London regional 
government provide a ready model for regional governance throughout England. Yet central 
government does not apply the rationale and structures of London regional governance to other 
English regions.    
 
 
City Regions  
 
“In the mid-2000s, ‘city region’ suddenly became a popular idea within the national ministry charged 
with local government, housing and planning responsibilities in England. It was not a new concept, as 
it had been argued for (and rejected) as a basis for reorganizing local government back in the 1960s” 
(Healy 2009, p 837).   
 
There has been some attention, under both New Labour and the coalition, to the city-region, a broad 
conception that potentially forms part of English sub-national government. There are many 
variations of meaning attaching to city region but here it will be taken to mean something 
geographically less than the region, and more than the current units of local government. It may 
have some correspondence with the former metropolitan county areas, but the fit would be highly 
imperfect. Economically, it may denote travel-to-work areas or more sophisticated definitions of 
areas of economic activity. It certainly implies some level of geographic and economic coherence 
rather than simply denoting an administrative boundary.  
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Healey (2009) has made the important point that city regions, as well as describing functional 
economic zones or spatial planning areas, also invoke constructed concepts of time and place. 
Different actors can read different meanings into their own images of a city region. It is what we 
imagine it to be. Healy adds that the city region may denote relations and qualities that are not 
necessarily compatible, for instance between relations of history and identity, production or 
citizenship. Even if one were to take a simplified view of a city region as, say, a travel-to-work area 
with some overall economic identity then the problem immediately encountered, in addition to the 
overlap with other tiers of administration (Harrison 2012), is the lack of an existing governance 
model for such an area.  The ‘metro mayor’, as discussed below, has been advanced as one way of 
filling this gap, yet the point remains that if the city region can be constructed over time in a number 
of different ways, for a number of different stakeholders, then it may not readily accommodate any 
stable arrangements for governance at all.  
 
 
English Local Government: The Preoccupation with Structure   
 
“Today, England has 353 principal authorities. Some of these are single unitary authorities, others 
operate in tiers of district and county councils. The number of different councils doing similar things 
remains costly and confusing. For many, the range of different systems is baffling too. Scotland and 
Wales, on the other hand, both have a system of single unitary authorities with clear accountability 
and responsibilities”. (Heseltine, 2012, p 30).     
 
English local government is complicated, with little coherence. It has developed incrementally, and 
exhibits a variety of different organisational structures.  
 
 London has its own structure of boroughs together with an elected London-wide assembly 
and a London-wide elected mayor.  
 
 The local government reorganisation of 1995-1998 created ‘unitary’ councils in some parts 
of England previously administered by two-tier structures. This partial reorganisation 
followed a contentious review exercise, involving a lengthy process of horse-trading and the 
scrapping of some initial recommendations. Forty-six new unitary councils were in place by 
April 1998, with some mildly newsworthy results (such as the re-creation of Rutland). Yet the 
government held back from applying the unitary principle universally, on the grounds that 
different parts of England have different needs and hence require differing local structures. 
It is striking that this argument was not applied to Scotland or Wales.  
 
 The further reorganisation of 2008-2009 revisited the question of whether a two-tier 
structure of county and district councils would persist, at least in selected areas. A new 
review process, following an ‘invitation to reorganise’, created single-tier councils as the sole 
elective authority for some areas, based on the premise that leadership and accountability 
are harder to achieve with two tiers of local government. From 2009, this created some 
geographically large single-tier councils (such as Northumberland). Others (such as Cumbria) 
retained two-tiers. The basis for different decisions in different areas was not always 
immediately apparent (Elcock, Fenwick and McMillan 2010).    
 
 In the main conurbations, including West Yorkshire, Tyne and Wear, and Merseyside, 
metropolitan borough councils remain responsible for the whole range of services in a 
single-tier system, the elected councils for these metropolitan county areas having been 
abolished in 1986.  
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 In some non-metropolitan former counties, including Cleveland and Humberside, the county 
authorities were abolished in a separate reorganisation in 1996, again leaving a single (non-
metropolitan) tier of administration. There was a prevailing narrative, not least from central 
government, that these names did not signify real places with real public recognition - 
although Cleveland, if not Humberside, is certainly a place and name with firm historical 
roots.     
 
 Throughout the whole system, parish or town councils may or may not exist to administer 
limited local services.  
 
Of course, this system makes no sense at all, and no government would design such an incoherent 
set of arrangements from the start. Central policy has offered local government two messages, not 
always compatible. There has been the encouragement for councils to ‘think big’, for instance in the 
creation of large unitary councils, city regions, joint procurement, shared services and collaboration 
with public and private partners. Equally, there has been a message to ‘think small’, for instance in 
embracing ‘localism’, neighbourhood and local ‘place’ as the key reference points, and enhancing 
community government. These dual pressures featured under New Labour and coalition 
government alike.   
 
Lord Heseltine (2012, p 54) recommended that all local authorities in England work toward unitary 
status, but, significantly, they should also work together with other councils as well as with Local 
Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs). This would be a simplification of governance. However the scale of 
any proposed unitary authority should not be overlooked. Replacing a two-tier system with a unitary 
council might otherwise increase centralisation further. Much would depend on its scale.  
 
 
Partnership   
 
During the New Labour years, partnership became a key part of English local governance. This was 
much more than encouraging local authorities to work with other agencies: partnership was built-in 
to the framework of local governance. Local Area Agreements (LAAs) existed from 2004 to 2010. 
LAAs, increasingly linked to the new regime of Comprehensive Area Assessment (CAA), were 
accompanied by stronger Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs). Partnership was the formalised basis 
for joint working and strategic commissioning. LSPs were an essential vehicle for achieving strategic 
objectives, and partnership working was closely linked to the prevailing performance regime. Very 
significant parts of New Labour policy at local level, including Sure Start, Action Zones for 
Employment, New Deal for Communities and Community Safety were predicated upon 
institutionalised partnership working.  
 
Under the coalition, partnership remains but its emphasis has changed considerably. The abolition of 
centrally-defined government performance indicators removed the basis for much of the work of 
LSPs. Although partnership in the New Labour years arguably represented the triumph of 
bureaucratic hierarchy over true co-governance (Fenwick, Johnston Miller and McTavish 2012), 
under the coalition the argument has shifted ground further. The current LEPs place considerable 
importance on private sector involvement and leadership. Yet a recent IPPR report (Cox et al 2014) 
suggested that although the economic plans of LEPs are clearly directed toward immediate growth, 
they are not necessarily engaged with the ‘resilience’ needed to deal with any future economic 
downturn.  
 
 
Political Management    
6 
 
 
Although structural reorganisation of English local government is not currently a political priority, 
political management - the question of how local authorities are managed and led - remains a live 
topic. The Local Government Act 2000 offered local authorities in England and Wales three options 
for reforming political management. These were a directly-elected mayor with a council manager 
(since removed from the statute book), a directly-elected mayor with a cabinet, or a council leader 
and cabinet. Smaller districts were permitted ‘other arrangements’. The Government argued that 
new systems of executive leadership would improve co-ordination of services, provide a clear focus 
for managing relationships with partners, streamline decision-making and enhance accountability. In 
the case of the elected mayor, it was envisaged that local leaders would for the first time possess 
public legitimacy through direct electoral mandate.  
 
The initial group of elected mayors took office in 2002, but only in eleven local councils (excluding 
the London mayor, a post governed by different legislation, and with different powers). The 
overwhelming majority of councils in England, and all councils in Wales, opted not to adopt the 
executive mayor form of leadership. The council leader (chosen by other councillors) and cabinet 
became the norm, replacing the old committee structures inherited from the nineteenth century.   
 
Yet the mayoral debate persists. Several points can be made about the strange case of the English 
mayor and the part it now plays in sub-national governance.   
 
First, political parties have continued to argue the merits of elected mayors and encourage adoption 
of this form of local leadership even though there is scant evidence of public enthusiasm. Central 
government continues to see the elected mayor as an answer to the problem of local leadership, a 
process facilitated by further legislation in 2007 which made adoption of the mayoral system 
possible by simple council resolution rather than local referendum. The coalition organised 
referendums in ten of England’s largest cities in 2012 on whether to establish a mayoral system: in 
only one case, Bristol, was there an affirmative vote. Two councils which previously had a mayoral 
system have now abandoned it. In May 2014, Copeland Borough Council (a district authority in 
Cumbria) conducted a public-initiated referendum on whether to establish the office of elected 
mayor. Voters decided by a substantial majority to do so. Yet, even including Copeland, there are in 
2014 only sixteen directly elected mayors in England (excluding the London Mayor).  
 
Secondly, the mayor was envisaged as an answer not only to local leadership, but specifically to the 
problem of city leadership. Positive images were invoked of the heroic mayors of the world’s great 
cities. Yet it is striking that of the very few places opting initially for the directly elected mayor, none 
were in England’s big cities. Positive referendum votes were confined to relatively small 
municipalities where there had been some perceived problem with local events or local governance. 
Although the cities of Leicester and Liverpool opted for the mayoral system in 2010 and 2012, this 
was by council resolution not popular vote.  
 
Thirdly, the mayor can be seen as bringing together political and managerial leadership in a way 
hitherto unknown in British political life. If the mayor truly occupies the summit of decision-making 
and leadership, the role of the Chief Executive and Chief Officers inevitably changes. This makes the 
mayor a unique figure, potentially exercising governance and leadership functions previously 
diffused across the committee-based decision-making structures of local government.  
 
Debate continues about the future of elected mayors in England, pursued with a vigour that is 
surprising given the lack of any obvious public interest (Fenwick and Elcock 2014). The question of 
‘metro mayors’ for areas larger than current local government units, linked to city-regions or other 
formulations of urban conurbation, has been suggested for governance of the “functioning 
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economic area” (Warwick Commission 2012, p 9). The Heseltine report on growth also 
recommended (2012, p 57) that mayors be elected for combined local authority areas. Both 
recommendations presuppose a relationship between local leadership and place and are consistent 
with a renewed focus on ‘place-based leadership’ (Hambleton and Howard 2013; Hambleton and 
Sweeting 2014).  
 
 
Sub-National Governance and Economic Growth  
 
 “...the North and its constituent economic areas need much greater autonomy over the drivers and 
the proceeds of growth. City regions and their hinterlands need greater control over the decisions 
that can drive economic growth. They need to be able to control their own budgets and raise their 
own revenues in line with their aspirations.” (IPPR/NEFC 2012, p 7)  
 
A number of incentives for growth have been established under the coalition. The ‘Enterprise Zones’ 
of earlier Conservative times were resurrected; a Regional Growth Fund compensates, to a limited 
degree, for the abolition of the RDAs; and ‘City Deals’ in selected English cities provide additional 
investment through greater collaboration with public and private providers. The principal instrument 
of local growth is intended to be the Local Enterprise Partnership (LEP). The LEP areas are meant to 
relate to functional economic areas. These areas may not necessarily align with local political units of 
governance. Institutionally, the LEP can be seen as a successor to the RDA, although the LEP is 
private-sector led, is not funded to anywhere near the same extent as the former RDA, and it can 
treat some previously major areas of activity (notably tourism) as entirely discretionary. Heseltine 
(2012, p 40) notes that “...LEPs simply do not...have the authority or resource to transform their 
locality in the way our economy needs”.  
 
Consistent with the broad message of the Heseltine report (2012), an independent review 
commissioned by the North East Local Enterprise Partnership reported in April 2013 (North East LEP 
2013). This enquiry, led by Lord Andrew Adonis, and with substantial private industry input, drew 
conclusions specifically related to the North East economy, including the development of economic 
infrastructure and expansion of education and training, and, significantly, devolved regional control 
over key budgets. This, alongside the Heseltine recommendations, is important. It suggests that 
political elites across the main parties, along with business leaders, are actively arguing the case for 
regional devolution and budgetary devolution in the interests of economic growth. This is a very 
different regional agenda from the failed attempt to establish an elected assembly for this region in 
2004 – the terms of debate have changed - but it is an emergent regional agenda nonetheless.   
Both the Heseltine and Adonis reports contain echoes of what has gone before, although both recast 
the regional debate in different terms. Heseltine advocated a beefed-up role for a better-resourced 
LEP plus new Local Growth Teams of civil servants, supporting the strategic role of groups of LEPs. 
Such teams are faintly reminiscent of the role performed by the former Government Offices in the 
regions. Adonis advocated the amalgamation of the seven local authorities in the North East LEP 
region into a combined authority, giving priority to transport, apprenticeships and business growth. 
This is an echo of the former metropolitan county authorities that existed from 1974 to 1986 
(Sandford 2014, p 1). Subsequently, in April 2014, combined authorities for the North East and three 
other conurbations were indeed established. Further, Michael Dugher, Shadow Minister for the 
Cabinet Office, announced in 2014 that Labour would introduce regional ministers to “oversee” nine 
regional networks and ensure that economic growth is spread more evenly across England: “Labour 
is pledging to introduce Regional Ministers to put the voice of the English regions at the heart of 
Labour decision-making” (Labour List 2014). A report in August 2014 from five Northern councils 
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(self-described as ‘city regions’) advanced a densely-argued “proposition for an interconnected 
North” (Leeds City Council et al 2014).      
It is worth noting that private sector associations, including the Confederation of British Industry 
(CBI), continue to operate on a defined regional basis even though the regional infrastructure of the 
public sector has been dismantled around them. Clearly some major parts of private industry 
consider the maintenance of a regional organisation to be valuable even where central government 
does not.   
 
 
Conclusions  
 
 “What we have at the moment is an asymmetric form of devolution...There is a parliament in 
Scotland and assemblies in Wales and Northern Ireland...but with politicians from those three 
jurisdictions still having a vote on solely English affairs. A symmetrical form of devolution would 
balance these three institutions with a parliament for England or its regions, but ever since the 
referendum in the North East of England rejected the idea of a local assembly, the whole concept has 
been abandoned. The English just don’t seem to have any appetite for regionalised devolution.” 
(Monteith, 2013)  
 
There is no devolved national administration for England or its regions. The Local Government 
Association has suggested merging existing England-only departments (for instance, transport, 
energy and environment) into a single Office for England. Yet governance is not just a matter of 
structures; it is - more importantly - a matter of the identity which gave rise to devolved 
administration in the first place. Even where the nature and affiliation of such an identity is bitterly 
contested, as in Northern Ireland, there is nonetheless unanimity that identity in itself is important. 
English sub-national identities may well be asserted but are not a significant influence on 
governance or policy.  
 
In the North East of England reference to regional identity has tended to be perceived as relatively 
strong. It is no accident that this region was the site of the only referendum on establishing a 
regional assembly. A distinct regional identity has also been asserted in Cornwall. Both North East 
England and Cornwall are geographically remote from the seat of UK central government, a simple 
but powerful fact in shaping separate identity. Furthermore (and unlike anywhere else in England) 
Cornish identity may be expressed as ‘national’ rather than ‘regional’ if the premise is accepted that 
Cornwall is not truly part of England at all. European recognition of official ‘minority status’ for 
Cornwall in April 2014 may serve to support the case for a national Cornish identity. Crucially, 
Cornwall is also differentiated from North East England by access to a separate language rather than 
a distinct (English) dialect. But in neither case does such an identity yet reflect a popular social force 
strong enough to influence political and policy decisions about governance. Decentralisation reforms 
require widespread popular support in order to succeed (Gash, Randall and Sims 2014). Scottish 
devolution was underwritten by such support. English regional devolution is not.   
 
Thus English governance remains both complex and deeply problematic. As discussed, there is no 
distinct institutional framework for the governance of England as a whole. This in itself differentiates 
England from the other component parts of the UK. At sub-national level within England, there is no 
formal regional dimension of governance. At local government level, different structures and 
political management arrangements obtain, varying from one place to another. Within this mix, 
England remains one of the most highly centralised countries in Europe. The resident of a small 
English unitary district (the very existence of which is constitutionally in the gift of central 
government) is governed by no further tier of elected administration until reaching that of the UK as 
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a whole. In international terms this is strikingly odd. With the withering away of former regional 
institutions, the current trend is toward further centralisation. English regional movements 
demanding devolution are not politically influential. In this context, can there be an agenda for the 
active advancement of English sub-national governance?  
 
 
Combined Authorities  
 
English local authorities, as discussed, already have the power (under legislation introduced in 2009) 
to group themselves into larger ‘combined authorities’, dealing with transport, economic 
development and other strategic priorities. The ten councils in Greater Manchester established a 
combined authority in 2011. The four further combined authorities established in 2014 may prove to 
be a significant development in sub-national governance, for they embody what amounts to a ‘city 
region’ focus without creating new bureaucratic institutions. They also avoid the need for (another) 
structural local government reorganisation. Two of the combined authorities, interestingly, 
incorporate the term ‘city region’ in their working titles. It is too early to assess their impact, but 
they reflect the aspirations of both Heseltine (2012) and Adonis (North East LEP 2013) in building 
upwards from existing local institutions.   
 
 
Federalism 
 
Within the limited public and political discussions about English governance there has been a striking 
tendency to avoid the F word. Even major enquiries such as the McKay Commission, set up to 
consider “...how the House of Commons might deal with legislation which affects only part of the 
United Kingdom, following the devolution of certain legislative powers to the Scottish Parliament, 
the Northern Ireland Assembly and the National Assembly for Wales” (2013, p 7) did not directly 
engage with English internal devolution. Further, the Commission was explicitly dismissive of a 
“federal” solution predicated on identifiable English regions (2013, p 24). The Liberal Democrat MP 
for Orkney and Shetland, Alistair Carmichael, referred in June 2014 to the continuing “anomaly” of 
Scottish MPs like himself being able to vote on England-only legislation, adding that “federalism is 
the logical conclusion of all this – but that is the decision for people in England to make” (BBC News 
2014b). With greater powers progressively being devolved to other parts of the UK this anomaly 
grows. Carmichael suggests the “logic” is that “the English sort out their constitutional position” 
(BBC News 2014b). Such views, when expressed by a sitting Scottish Secretary, suggest that an 
explicit federal debate may be starting to emerge.    
 
 
English Regions and Growth  
 
If regional identity does not provide the strongest prospect for advancing sub-national governance in 
England, it may be that the emphasis on growth represents the main opportunity for reinventing the 
regional and the local. Demands for growth from across the political spectrum are beginning to 
embrace the realisation that there are local and regional ways to achieve it - or even that there are 
only local and regional ways to achieve it. There are indications that private industry takes this view 
and a realisation that the demise of regional development infrastructure has had negative 
consequences. The message that political and business elites in England are taking regions seriously 
is evident in both the Heseltine (2012) and Adonis (North East LEP 2013) reports and in subsequent 
developments. For instance, responding to the establishment of the North East combined authority 
in April 2014, the Chief Executive of the North East Chamber of Commerce said "with the right 
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structures in place this area can maximise its significant competitive advantages and continue to set 
the pace nationally for economic growth." (BBC News 2014a).  
 
 
The Impact of Scottish Governance  
 
Scottish experience, whatever its long-term trajectory post-referendum, has potential consequences 
for English sub-national governance. In the ‘borderlands’ of North-East England and Cumbria positive 
cross-border opportunities for economic development may be enhanced by greater Scottish self-
determination (Shaw et al 2013), a view echoed by the Scottish First Minister in asserting that 
Scottish independence “would create opportunities for co-operation and partnership which would 
benefit the north of England more than anywhere else” (Salmond 2014). Alternatively, competition 
from Scotland, supported by its strong and effective infrastructure, may impact negatively on 
neighbouring English regions. For instance, Amazon’s decision in 2011 to locate a major distribution 
centre in Dunfermline rather than England reflected the difference between the incentives offered 
by Scottish Enterprise and the contrasting position of a small borough council which could no longer 
avail itself of support from recently-abolished regeneration agency One North East. Furthermore, in 
future, England and Scotland may conceivably levy different rates of – for instance - Corporation Tax 
or Air Passenger Duty. The overall direction of competitive advantage is impossible to predict but it 
is likely to be an important part of any debate about future patterns of English governance.     
 
 
Developing the Terms of Debate  
 
The continuing political interest in new forms of local governance around elected mayors, especially 
for wider geographic areas than those of existing local authorities, may in time generate new 
approaches to sub-national governance in England. Current mayoral options have met with little 
public enthusiasm but this does not preclude emergent forms of governance that enjoy public 
endorsement, if driven locally rather than representing a prescribed series of choices from central 
government. More generally, following the Scottish referendum, as arguments about self-
determination and devolution become more familiar terms of debate to English audiences - and 
especially to English political elites - a discourse about English sub-national governance may 
gradually move into the political mainstream. Within this debate, federalism may start to be 
discussed rationally using examples from other successful nation states, rather than being used 
emotionally (as it tends to be in relation to the European Union where, strangely, its meaning is 
often inverted to invoke an unwelcome centralism). Despite the experience of recent years, such 
elements may yet serve to place English sub-national governance on the political and policy agenda 
and, longer-term, provide the basis for a new sub-national settlement in England.  
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